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Which Wars Spread? 
Commitment Problems and Military Intervention 
 
This article argues that wars caused by commitment problems are 
more likely to experience outside military intervention than are 
wars with other causes. Wars caused by commitment problems are 
more likely to draw in outside states because they tend to be more 
severe and produce larger wars aims. These larger stakes create 
both threats and opportunities for non-belligerent states thereby 
prompting military intervention. The greater stakes also generate 
incentives for belligerent states to seek outside aid. This 
relationship between commitment problems and intervention 
implies that while certain types of wars may be more likely to 
experience intervention, the same causes can explain both 
intervention and war initiation. The argument is tested on the 
Correlates of War Interstate War dataset using logit-based 
generalized linear models. The findings support the commitment 
problem hypothesis and have implications for the bargaining 
framework and for theories about the causes of multilateral and 
general wars. 
 
The question of why states intervene militarily in interstate wars has both theoretical and 
practical implications.1 Military intervention matters for theory as explanations of wars should be 
able to explain not only their causes and termination, but why they sometimes draw in additional 
states and how they are fought. From a practical standpoint, the question matters as interstate 
wars which experience military intervention are longer and deadlier than those that do not 
(Shirkey 2012b; Slantchev 2004). While substantial progress has been made on which states are 
more likely to intervene (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Richardson 1960; Siverson and 
Starr 1991; Valeriano and Vasquez 2010)2 and when they are likely to do so (Joyce, Ghosn, and 
Bayer 2014; Melin and Koch 2010; Shirkey 2009; 2012a), far less is known about which wars 
are likely to draw in outside states. 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank the Hunter College Political Science research seminar participants, Jeff Carter, Michael Lee, 
Jack Levy, Alex Weisiger, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and advice. 
2 Geographically proximate states, great powers, and allies are more likely to intervene. 
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 I argue interstate wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to experience 
military intervention than are wars with other causes. Commitment problems are where one party 
to an agreement has sufficiently strong incentives to renege that it cannot credibly pledge to 
honor the agreement. Commitment problems often arise due to expectations about future shifts in 
relative power or where the agreement itself significantly alters relative power. These expected 
power shifts create incentives for the disadvantaged party to wage a preventive war (Wayman 
1996), where preventive wars are attempts to avoid expected adverse shifts in relative power. 
While incentives to preempt could also create commitment problems (Fearon 1995), preemptive 
wars are exceedingly rare (Reiter 1995) meaning wars fought over commitment problems are 
most likely to be preventive in nature and arise from concerns over power shifts. For this reason, 
the article focuses on wars waged out of preventive rather than preemptive motives. 
There are several reasons to believe wars caused by commitment problems are more 
likely to attract intervention than are other wars. First, both wars which experience military 
intervention and wars caused by commitment problems are deadlier and longer on average 
(Copeland 2000; Powell 2006; 2012; Reiter 2009; Shirkey 2012b; Slantchev 2004; Weisiger 
2013). This suggests the higher severity of such wars has a common cause. Second, wars fought 
over commitment problems produce larger war aims and are more likely to alter global, regional, 
and sub-regional power structures (Weisiger 2013). This in turn creates both balancing concerns 
and opportunities to bandwagon. It may also create additional commitment problems for outside 
states prompting their intervention (Shirkey 2012a; Wolford 2014a). 
The argument that shifts in relative power cause wars that are more likely to experience 
military intervention is distinct from Power Transition Theory (Geller 1992; Lemke 1996; 
Organski and Kugler 1980) in that the power shifts do not need to be between competitors for 
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global, regional, or sub-regional hegemony. Nor must the shifts result in power parity or in a 
power transition. Rather any shift which substantially alters the distribution of power—whether 
moving the distribution towards or away from parity—can potentially cause a commitment 
problem. 
In making this argument, I aim to contribute to the debate between the bargaining 
framework (and the expected utility literature upon which it draws) and some of its detractors 
about whether multilateral and bilateral wars can be explained by the same set of causes or 
whether distinct explanations are needed for each (Bueno de Mesquita 1990; Levy 1990; 
Midlarsky 1990; Rasler and Thompson 1985; Thompson 1990; Valeriano and Vasquez 2010; 
Vasquez, et al 2011). I do so by showing that while both types of wars can be explained by the 
bargaining framework, wars which prompt military intervention are likely to come from a 
specific cause within that framework: commitment problems. The article also contributes to the 
wider literature by showing that the bargaining framework can be applied to a broad range of 
political phenomena associated with war. Specifically, I show that the framework helps to 
explain war expansion and not just war onset and war termination. 
The argument is tested on the Correlates of War Interstate War dataset version 4.0 using 
logit-based generalized linear models. Commitment problems are operationalized as pre-war 
shifts in the primary belligerent states’ relative National Material Capabilities. The findings 
suggest that wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to experience military 
intervention and that the bargaining model of war is able to explain both bilateral and 
multilateral wars.  
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Differing Views on the Relationship between War Initiation and Military Intervention 
 Most rationalists see war initiation, war termination, and military intervention as 
stemming from the same general theory of war—bargaining and expected utility (Altfeld and 
Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Blainey 1973; Bueno de Mesquita 1990; Fearon 1995; Shirkey 2009; 
Wagner 2007; Wolford 2014a). Scholars working within this framework argue states calculate 
whether fighting would advance their goals at acceptable costs and make decisions about 
belligerency in the same manner regardless if they are considering initiating a conflict, 
continuing it, or intervening. Wars and military intervention occur when agreements cannot be 
struck—most often because of private information with incentives to misrepresent or 
commitment problems (Fearon 1995). While wars resulting from such breakdowns vary greatly 
in scope and severity, some within the bargaining framework claim this variation is a matter of 
quantity not quality (Bueno de Mesquita 1990). This means multilateral or even general wars are 
best seen as smaller wars which grew to include many other states when those states, using a 
similar calculus to the initial belligerents, decided to intervene (Levy 1990; Thompson 1990). 
Furthermore, the bargaining framework argues that war initiation is affected by beliefs 
about the likelihood of intervention (Gartner and Siverson 1996; Levy 2011) and any given 
intervention or potential intervention alters the likelihood of further interventions (Stevenson 
2011). Therefore, war initiation and intervention cannot be considered in isolation from each 
other. Indeed, the decision to intervene may be taken prior to the outbreak of war. Levy (2011) 
cites Russia’s determination to join Austria in a war against Prussia prior to the outbreak of the 
Seven Years War (1756–1763) as a prominent example of this. Other ante-bellum decisions to 
intervene include the French intervention in the War of Italian Unification (1859), Italian 
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involvement in the Seven Weeks War (1866), and British and French participation in the Suez 
Crisis (1956) (Shirkey 2012b). 
Despite such occasional pre-war plans to intervene, it is generally unclear ex ante which 
wars will prompt military intervention (Bueno de Mesquita 1990). Likewise, there is significant 
debate even ex post about which wars were general wars (Copeland 2000; Kugler 1990; Levy 
1982; Thompson 1988; 1990) reinforcing the notion that states cannot readily distinguish which 
wars will attract intervention ex ante. Thus, the bargaining framework sees initiation and 
intervention as intimately linked and argues that multilateral and bilateral wars can be explained 
by the same theory. 
This view is not without detractors. Critics of the bargaining framework dispute both that 
dyadic and larger wars can be explained by the same causes and that the initial outbreak of war 
and intervention can be explained by the same processes. The first objection is that distinct 
theories are needed to explain initiation and intervention (Midlarsky 1990; Vasquez, et al 2011). 
This is different from claiming that any given intervention has an idiosyncratic cause which is 
distinct from the specific cause of the larger war (Levy 2011). That is certainly true, but is 
consistent with the bargaining framework. Rather, the claim is that there are separate paths to the 
outbreak and spread of war (Valeriano and Vasquez 2010). Whether both paths could be 
consistent with the bargaining framework is debated with Valeriano and Vasquez (2010) 
suggesting they may be and Midlarsky (1990) arguing they are not. 
The second objection is that bilateral and general wars need distinct explanations 
(Midlarsky 1990; Rasler and Thompson 1985; Thompson 1988; Vasquez et al 2011).3 This 
school of thought argues structural forces and not the decisions of states within the bargaining 
                                                          
3 There is overlap between these objections with some scholars believing both that initiation and intervention have 
distinct causes and that general and dyadic wars have distinct causes. 
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framework determine which wars become general and which remain limited. In other words, 
intervention is the product of the forces that cause general wars in the first place (Kugler 1995; 
Thompson 1988; Vasquez 2009).4 While this fits with a basic intuition that general wars cannot 
be seen simply as dyadic wars that grew, it does little to explain conflicts such as the Crimean 
War (1853–1856) or Gulf War (1990–1991) which did not become general but which did 
experience military intervention. Furthermore, general wars often grow out of wars that are 
initiated in the hope they will remain limited or even bilateral in character (Sabrosky 1985) 
begging the question of why such hopes could have been held if general wars are inherently 
distinct from more limited wars in their causes.5 For example, Austria-Hungary, while willing to 
risk a wider war in 1914, hoped that its war with Serbia would remain localized. Similarly, North 
Korea hoped the Korean War (1950–1953) would remain bilateral and the United States later 
hoped to avoid Chinese intervention in that same war. 
In sum, both the bargaining framework of war and its critics have important insights and 
yet leave something to be desired. The bargaining framework is at its best in suggesting that war 
results from the breakdown of bilateral agreements, tacit or explicit, to remain at peace and that 
such breakdowns explain both initiation and intervention. The critics are strongest at suggesting 
that general wars are more than just bilateral disputes which grew and instead that general wars 
have distinct causes. As general wars are characterized by military intervention, it may be that 
                                                          
4 Midlarsky (1990) argues general wars result from the accumulation of many disputes whereas dyadic wars result 
from single disputes. Yet work on rivalry has shown that dyadic wars within rivalries are a result of issue 
accumulation (Dreyer 2010), meaning the presence of multiple issues in and of itself is not sufficient to explain 
general wars. 
5 The Steps to War research program (Vasquez 2009) offers an even more complicated model of war. It proposes 
that wars between rivals are distinct from wars over single issues and that both types of war can experience military 
intervention. Each type requires its own theoretical explanation and intervention in either type requires a further 
distinct theory. Yet Vasquez states that multilateral wars are best seen as a series of dyadic conflicts, begging the 
question of why these conflicts cannot all be explained by the same theory. 
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wars which attract military intervention, whether general or more limited, also have causes 
which are distinct from those of wars that do not attract intervention. 
Thus, each view captures part of the relationship between war onset and military 
intervention. I propose a synthesis which recognizes there are multiple pathways to war (Bremer 
1995; Diehl 1995; Kugler 1990; Vasquez 1995), but that the multiple pathways can be explained 
by one overarching theory: the bargaining framework. I argue that a specific cause of war with 
that framework—commitment problems—makes intervention more likely to occur in those wars 
than in wars with other causes. 
Wars Caused by Commitment Problems and Military Intervention 
 Wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to prompt military intervention for 
two reasons. First, such wars are more likely to result in greater war aims such as state death, 
regime change, significant territorial annexation, or even near genocidal policies and absolutist 
war-fighting strategies. These goals arise as a way to eliminate the commitment problem by 
halting or minimizing shifts in the future distribution of power or significantly altering the 
existing distribution of power (Leventoglu and Slantchev 2007; Powell 2006; 2012; Reiter 2009; 
Stanley 2009; Weisiger 2013).6 Because of this, these wars are more likely to substantially alter 
the existing power structure of a sub-region, region, or even the world (Weisiger 2013). 
Belligerent states benefiting from these power shifts may be unable to credibly commit to not use 
this new advantage to harm third parties thereby prompting those third parties to intervene. Thus, 
wars caused by commitment problems are likely to create incentives to balance against one of 
the belligerent parties in order to prevent an altering of the greater status quo. 
                                                          
6 This is consistent with a separate literature which argues issue salience influences how many costs states are 
willing to bear (Diehl 1995; Vasquez 2009). 
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Second, wars fought over commitment problems are likely to be more severe—again due 
to extreme war aims. This means belligerent states should be willing to make greater efforts to 
win such wars, and therefore, be more willing to offer spoils to attract bandwagoners to their 
side.7 Greater severity also means these wars are more likely to result in significant territorial 
realignments creating opportunities for interveners to pick up territorial spoils. Combining these 
two elements means that belligerents should also be more willing to distribute territorial spoils to 
attract allies increasing the odds of outside intervention. For example, during World War Two 
(1939–1945) Germany rewarded bandwagoners such as Hungary with territorial spoils. 
Belligerents should also be more willing to offer non-territorial spoils, such as aid or 
promises of future alignment, in order to induce states to intervene. For instance, US offers of 
military aid played an important role in inducing South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines to 
intervene in the Vietnam War (1965–1975) (Shirkey 2009). Of course, the high costs and risks 
associated with such wars may also deter potential interveners (Haldi 2003), but for many states 
the opportunities offered by intervention are likely to outweigh these greater costs. Taken 
together these two reasons provide the article’s core hypothesis. 
H1: Interstate wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to 
experience military intervention. 
 
 The connection between wars caused by commitment problems and military intervention 
suggests two additional hypotheses. First as discussed above, resolving commitment problems 
through war requires states to pursue highly revisionist war aims. Prior research has shown that 
states with very large revisionist aims are far more likely to violate norms of neutrality than are 
more moderately revisionist powers (Wolford 2014b). This should be especially true for gross 
                                                          
7 The nature of the spoils offered may be shaped by the regime type of the potential intervener. Private goods and 
territory may appeal more to autocracies, whereas non-territorial public goods may appeal more to democracies (see 
Bueno de Mesquita et al 1999). 
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violations of neutrality such as the bombardment, invasion, or occupation of neutral powers. This 
means gross violations of neutrality should be more likely to occur in wars caused by 
commitment problems as a result of the increased presence of these highly revisionist belligerent 
states in such wars. In particular, such highly revisionist states should be more willing to attack 
or occupy neutral powers forcing these states into the conflict.8 
H2: Neutral powers should be more likely to be involuntarily forced into the war 
as a result of being attacked or occupied by belligerent states in wars caused by 
commitment problems than in wars with other causes. 
 
The final hypothesis builds on the observation that while most military intervention 
occurs many months or years after a war has begun, roughly a third of states join within a month 
of the onset of hostilities.9 While it is likely that commitment problems as a cause of war are 
associated with intervention in both the early and later stages of wars, the strength of those 
relationships are not necessarily equal. One possibility is that since the commitment problem that 
caused the war must have existed prior to the war’s onset, it should trigger intervention sooner 
rather than later. This is because states would be aware of the commitment problem from the 
beginning of the war implying that if states are prompted to intervene because of the 
commitment problem, they would do so quickly. 
H3a: The relationship between military intervention and wars caused by 
commitment problems should be stronger for interventions in the first month of 
the war than interventions which occur later. 
 
Equally possible, however, is that the threat posed by the war to regional or global power 
distributions and any resulting alterations of the territorial status quo may not be apparent at the 
outset of the conflict. This is because until battles are fought it may be uncertain how decisive 
                                                          
8 States which are invaded or occupied in this manner have what Siverson and Starr (1991) call low decision latitude 
in that their decision about belligerency is reduced to deciding whether or not to resist the invasion. 
9 27 of the 99 instances of military intervention in interstate war in the COW dataset occurred in the first 30 days of 
a war. 
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the war will be and thus the likely peace settlement and its implications for future distributions of 
power would be unclear. In other words, states may not be sure if they face threats that need to 
be balanced against or are presented with opportunities to bandwagon until after they observe the 
course of the war. Wars caused by commitment problems, therefore, may not induce states to 
intervene until the war is well underway.10 
H3b: The relationship between military intervention and wars caused by 
commitment problems should be stronger for later interventions than those which 
occur in the first month of the war. 
 
Thus, whether the relationship between commitment problems and military intervention is 
stronger earlier or later in wars is theoretically ambiguous and must be resolved empirically.  
 This is not an idle question. If commitment problems are more strongly correlated with 
early intervention, then the argument that wars which experience military intervention are 
distinct from the outset would be strengthened. This is because if such wars expanded very 
quickly, it would suggest that their distinct nature would have been apparent from the beginning 
of the war. Yet, if later interventions are more strongly associated with commitment problems it 
would suggest wars which experience military intervention would initially often appear similar 
to wars which remain bilateral. Though a key cause of intervention—commitment problems—
would be present from the outset, the effects of that cause would not manifest itself for months or 
perhaps even years. This would lend support to the bargaining framework’s view of war which 
holds that the difference between dyadic and general wars is more one of scale than type. The 
outcome of this test, therefore, has implications not just for the causes of military intervention 
but also for our understanding of war processes and the causes of multilateral and general wars. 
The argument—that wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to experience 
military intervention—like most causal claims in social science, is probabilistic. Wars which 
                                                          
10 This may be especially true for risk averse states or for states that significantly discount the future. 
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remained bilateral yet were caused by commitment problems—such as the Iran-Iraq War (1980–
1988) (Weisiger 2013) or Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) (Streich and Levy 2016)—have 
occurred as have wars which experienced intervention despite not having been caused by 
commitment problems. In other words, wars arising out of commitment problems are neither a 
necessary nor sufficient cause of military intervention. For example, states may intervene 
because of private information (Shirkey 2009). 
Also, this approach does not explain everything about military intervention. Most notably 
it does not address the timing of intervention nor which actors are more likely to join. However, 
it need not, as these questions have been addressed elsewhere (see above). Rather, it explains an 
important part of the intervention puzzle which has yet to receive sufficient attention. 
Variables, Methodology, and Results 
The above hypotheses are tested using generalized linear models on a dataset of 94 
interstate wars taken from the Correlates of War (COW) Interstate War dataset version 4.0 
(1816–2008) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Each case consists of single non-belligerent state at 
the outbreak of a given war. World War Two is disaggregated into two wars: one in Europe and 
one in the Pacific.11 This was done because it is unrealistic to see the Sino-Japanese War (1937–
1941) as ending in December 1941 rather than seeing it become a wider war due to Japanese 
attacks on US and British possessions in the Pacific in response to Anglo-American embargoes 
aimed at forcing Japan to abandon its war with China. Before discussing the statistical 
methodology in detail, the variables are described below. 
  
                                                          
11 This treatment results in the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Soviet 
Union, France, and Mongolia intervening in the Sino-Japanese War (World War Two in the Pacific). COW codes all 
of these states as participants in World War Two through the defeat of Japan in August 1945. This division excludes 
Mongolia, China, and Japan from World War Two in Europe. 
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Variables 
 The dependent variables are permutations of whether or not an outside state intervened 
militarily. These were taken from COW. The most basic version of the independent variable 
includes all states in COW which intervened at least a day after a given war’s initial outbreak. 
The second version includes only states which became belligerents as a direct result of their 
territory being invaded or their military forces being attacked—such as the United States at Pearl 
Harbor in 1941—and states which were militarily occupied during the course of a war, but which 
did not suffer sufficient casualties to be considered belligerents by COW.12 For brevity such 
states that were attacked or occupied will be called involuntary interveners hereafter. Last, 
military interveners were divided into early and late interveners. A state was considered an early 
intervener if it joined within 30 days of the war’s outbreak. States joining after 30 days were 
considered late interveners. A 30 day window should allow states which have decided to 
intervene because of factors which were evident ante-bellum to actually do so. Additionally, 
Shirkey (2009; 2012b) has found the 30 day cutoff to be significant. Specifically, ante-bellum 
alliances are predictive of intervention only during the first 30 days13 and intervention after a 
war’s first month increases war duration, but intervention in the first month does not. Thus, there 
are reasons to believe the nature of intervention changes around the 30 day mark. As will be seen 
below, the results are robust using different cutoffs. 
 The main independent variable is whether or not a war was caused by a commitment 
problem. As suggested by Weisiger (2013), commitment problems are operationalized as relative 
                                                          
12 Occupied states include Albania during World War One and Denmark, Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania during World War Two in Europe. Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Austria were not included as they were 
occupied prior to the onset of World War Two in Europe. Thailand was not included as the Japanese occupation of 
Thailand during World War Two in the Pacific was done with the acquiescence of the Thai government and 
Thailand remained independent throughout the war. Luxembourg was not included during World War One as COW 
does not consider Luxembourg to be a member of the state system until 1920. 
13 This finding is consistent with research that shows the relationship between alliances and intervention diminishes 
over time (Joyce, Ghosn, and Bayer 2014; Melin and Koch 2010). 
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power shifts in the COW National Material Capabilities version 4.0 (Singer 1987) between the 
two primary belligerents prior to the war.14 While this measure of states’ capabilities is 
imperfect—military expenditures may for instance include items such as sinecures for inactive 
officers and some states may have a hard time mobilizing their latent capabilities due to weak 
governments—the measure should be highly coordinated with states’ actual capabilities and it is 
unlikely that multiyear changes in the measure would be both independent of actual changes in 
power and also correlated with military intervention. In other words, though the measure is 
imperfect it is unlike to be biased and is likely to reflect true shifts in power. 
The power shift is measured over a period of five years ending the year prior to the war. 
This is done to avoid conflating the shift with mobilizations for the war which could produce 
apparent spikes in a state’s capabilities (see Weisiger 2013). A five year period was chosen as 
that is sufficiently long to avoid year to year noise, yet short enough to be confident that the shift 
is recent enough to actually be influencing decision-making rather than a past occurrence to 
which states have already responded. As will be seen below the results are robust to different 
time frames. 
Power shifts were selected as they are one of the major causes of commitment problems 
(Powell 2006) and are easily quantifiable. Incidentally much of the literature on general wars, 
without referencing commitment problems, suggests that power shifts are likely to proceed and 
cause general wars (Geller 1992; Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Organski and Kugler 1980; 
Thompson 1988) as well as smaller wars (Wayman 1996).15 
                                                          
14 Ideally, the measure would capture expectations about future power shifts (Bell and Johnson 2015), rather than 
actual power shifts, but such data are not available. 
15 This older literature argues that relative shifts in power create incentives to wage preventive wars and cause the 
declining power to worry that the rising power will revise existing agreements (Wayman 1996). In other words, 
older literature argues that commitment problems arise from relative power shifts, but simply uses different 
terminology. 
14 
 
The shift between the main two initial belligerents was used provided that they remained 
the primary belligerents on each side even after intervention occurred.16 The primary belligerent 
is the state considered to be the most important belligerent from a military standpoint on each 
side of the conflict (Weisiger 2013). In the vast majority of wars, the primary belligerents are 
among the initial belligerents. However, in the Crimean War, World War One (1914–1918), 
World War Two in Europe, World War Two in the Pacific, and the Gulf War one or more of the 
primary belligerents intervened after the war’s initial outbreak. In these cases, the power shift 
between the two most powerful opposing states in already the war is used for states which 
intervened prior to or simultaneously with the last member of the primary belligerents.17 Once 
both primary belligerents are in the war, the power shift between them is used for states which 
intervened thereafter or which never intervened. 
This method was adopted because in some wars changes in relative power between the 
initial belligerent pairing is not what concerns outside states. For instance, in World War One 
Britain had far more reason to be concerned about shifts in relative power between Germany and 
France rather than between the states which were the initial belligerents: Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia. It would be a significant distortion to insist that states that intervened after Germany and 
France had joined the war would be thinking in terms of an Austro-Serbian conflict, though of 
course early interveners like Russia were thinking in such terms. Thus, the shift between the 
most powerful belligerents already in the war prior to the entry of one or both of the primary 
belligerents is used for states that intervened prior to or simultaneously with one of the primary 
belligerents. This is because the early intervening states could not have known for certain that the 
                                                          
16 Weisiger’s (2013) list of primary belligerents was used. 
17 For the first intervener the most powerful belligerents already in the war will of course always come from among 
the initial belligerents. 
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primary belligerents would subsequently intervene, and therefore, their motives for intervention 
are more likely to be related to power shifts between states already in the war. 
Likewise, the primary belligerents were used rather than power shifts between all 
belligerents as states’ interventions could offset and obscure the shift which caused the 
commitment problem in the first place. Indeed, that is often the point of interventions. Also, the 
final roster of belligerent states cannot be known with certainty by states when they intervene; 
therefore, looking at the power shift across the final belligerent coalitions is inappropriate. 
The power shift variable was created using Weisiger’s (2013, 62) methodology which 
quantifies power shifts in relative capabilities as 1 − 𝑘 where for a pair of states {A, B} at times ∈
[1,2]: 
𝑘 =
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝐴1 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝐵2
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝐴2 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝐵1
 
State B is always the state that has experienced relative decline which ensures that 𝑘 is between 
zero and one and well-behaved. The quantity, 𝑘, is subtracted from one so that a rising value of 
the variable indicates an increasing degree in the power shift. Data on pre-war power shifts exist 
for the primary belligerents for 79 of the 94 interstate wars in COW.18 Of the 15 wars dropped 
from the analysis, three experienced intervention: the Second Balkan War (1913); the 
Hungarians Adversaries War (1919); and the Ifni War (1957–1958).19 
                                                          
18 The wars dropped are: Anglo-Persian; First Central American; First and Second Balkan; Russo-Polish War; 
Hungarian Adversaries; Lithuanian-Polish; First Kashmir; Arab-Israeli; Off Shore Islands; Ifni; Angola; Bosnian 
Independence; Azeri-Armenian; and Badme Border. Most of these involve newly independent states for which data 
were not available for the requisite five years. This means the findings may not translate well to wars involving 
newly independent states as such wars have been systematically excluded from the analysis. The data differ 
somewhat from those in Weisiger (2013) as he used version 3.02 of the National Materials Capabilities dataset as 
opposed to version 4.0. 
19 A fourth war, Angola, could be listed here. COW counts Angola as intervening as its forces did not enter combat 
until a few days after the forces of its Cuban ally did. As the war was fought in Angola over the nature of the 
Angolan regime, logic suggests Angola was a belligerent from the outset. 
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 Several control variables are included. First, greater geographic proximity to the war 
increases the odds a state will intervene as proximity increases the salience of the conflict and 
lowers the logistical costs of intervention (Richardson 1960; Siverson and Starr 1991; Shirkey 
2009). This concept is captured by a pair of dummy variables: whether or not a state was 
contiguous by land to the conflict and whether or not a state is in the same region as the war.20 
Second, states with allies in the war have been found to be more likely to intervene as 
states tend to share their allies’ interests and prefer that their allies win the wars they fight (Leeds 
2005; Siverson and Starr 1991; Shirkey 2009). Therefore, whether or not a non-belligerent state 
has a defense pact, neutrality pact, or entente with a belligerent power are each indicated by a 
dummy variable. Not having an alliance with the belligerent is the null category. These variables 
are taken from COW’s alliance dataset, version 4.1 (Gibler 2009). 
Third, some prior research suggests wars involving great powers are more likely to 
experience intervention than are other wars as they are more likely to influence regional and 
international systems (Kim 1991). Likewise, great powers are more likely to intervene as they 
are more able to alter the likely outcome of any given war and are more likely to have significant 
interests outside of their own region (Alfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Richardson 1960; 
Siverson and Starr 1991; Shirkey 2009). These factors are captured by dummy variables and are 
taken from COW (Correlates of War Project 2011). 
Fourth, a dummy variable indicates whether or not a non-belligerent state had an 
enduring rival in the war as the presence of such a rival could be an incentive to intervene to help 
                                                          
20 The states by COW country code in each region are: North America (2–95); South America (100–165); Europe 
(200–395 and 640 until 4/1913); West Africa (402–484); Southern and East Africa (490–591); Middle East and 
North Africa (600–698); Southern and Central Asia (700–705 and 750–790); Northeast Asia (365 and 710–740); 
Southeast Asia (800–850); Oceania (900–990). 
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defeat one’s enemy (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). This variable was created from 
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) list of enduring rivalries.21 
Fifth, dummy variables record both whether a non-belligerent state was a democracy and 
also if that state and at least one belligerent state were both democracies (joint democracy) as 
democracies may be more likely to intervene in general and more likely to intervene in the wars 
of other democracies. These were derived from Polity IV with a state being considered a 
democracy if the democracy minus autocracy score was six or greater (Marshall, Jaggers, and 
Gurr 2011). 
Sixth, a variable records whether or not the war occurred in the post-1945 era as Zacher 
(2001) suggests territorial realignment has been rare in this era. This may reduce incentives to 
intervene in order to bandwagon. Last, a dummy variable records whether or not the United 
Nations was acting as a collective security organization during the war as collective security can 
potentially widen wars (Betts 1992). The UN has acted as a collective security organization in 
only two interstate wars: the Korean War and the Gulf War.22 This variable does not test the 
proposition that collective security institutions cause wars to spread, but rather acts as a control 
for the UN’s role in these two wars which likely increased the rate of intervention in both wars. 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables can be seen in in Tables 1a and 1b. 
[Tables 1a and 1b here] 
Methodology 
 Given that the dependent variables are dichotomous, a binominal model is appropriate. 
Furthermore, as there is no reason to assume the standard errors are normally distributed 
                                                          
21 It was extended to 2003 by counting all of the enduring rivalries that were active as of 31 December 2001 as 
continuing through the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Excluding the Invasion of Iraq from the analysis has no effect on the 
rivalry variable. 
22 The relevant Security Council resolutions are Resolution 83 (27 June 1950) and Resolution 687 (29 November 
1990). 
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generalized linear models are appropriate. For these reasons, the data were analyzed using logit-
based generalized linear models. Duration models were not used as they assume the event in 
question will always occur given sufficient time. Yet states do not always intervene regardless of 
a war’s duration, thereby violating a central assumption of duration models. Similarly, a 
selection model was not used as the outcomes of intervention—such as if the intervening states 
end up on the winning side—are not being considered, making a selection model unnecessary. 
Coefficients and robust standard errors are reported. Each case represents a state which began a 
given war as a non-belligerent power. So in a world with ten states, a war which began 
bilaterally would produce eight cases. 
Results 
 The results provide clear support for the first two hypotheses (see Table 2). First, Model 
1 shows wars that are preceded by substantial power shifts—an indication of commitment 
problems—are correlated with and likely causal of military intervention in interstate wars (H1). 
Increasing the power shift by one standard deviation from its mean, while holding all the other 
variables at their medians, raises the odds of military intervention by nearly three-quarters—from 
0.07% to 0.12%. 
The overall likelihood remains quite low, but this is because the likelihood represents the 
odds that a given state will intervene in a given war. Intervention, like war itself, is a somewhat 
rare phenomenon. Even in wars with multiple interventions, such as the Korean War, most states 
remain non-belligerents. The overall likelihood is further depressed by the fact that the median 
for all of the control variables except for the post-1945 era is zero. In other words, the reported 
likelihood is the odds that a geographically remote, minor power would intervene in a given war 
in which it has no allies. Given that positive values of these controls increase the odds of 
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intervention (except for the post-1945 era when intervention is rarer for a given state), these 
results suggest a smaller substantive effect than would be the case for a political relevant state. 
If instead, the controls are set to reflect politically relevant states, the odds are 
substantially higher. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in the power shift nearly 
doubles the odds that a contiguous great power in the same region will join from 6.83% to a now 
substantively significant 11.01%. In the pre-1945 era the odds go from 32.70% to a very large 
45.04% (see Figure 1). These results show that power shifts—a proxy for commitment 
problems—are both statistically and substantively significant predictors of military intervention 
in interstate wars. 
[Table 2 here] 
[Figure 1 here] 
 Second, Model 2 shows pre-war power shifts are also significantly correlated with non-
belligerents states being attacked or occupied (H2).23 Holding all the other variables at their 
median, a one standard deviation increase in the power shift more than doubles the odds of such 
involuntary intervention from 0.004% to nearly 0.01%. Obviously, as suggested by the very low 
likelihood, such blatant disregard for the rights of neutrals is exceedingly rare. It happens only in 
exceptionally severe wars and generally only geographically proximate non-belligerent states are 
in danger of occupation or attack. 
Where these conditions are met, however, the danger is real. This can be seen by looking 
at the odds of a contiguous, non-great power state in the same region as the war being attacked or 
occupied during a war involving a great power. In such a scenario, a one standard deviation 
increase in the power shift more than doubles the odds of being attacked or occupied from 2.01% 
                                                          
23 Defense pacts, ententes, post-1945, and the UN variables were all omitted from the model as there are no 
instances of those variables being positively correlated with the dependent variable making their inclusion 
impossible. 
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to a substantively significant 4.74%. Happily, such blatant violations of international law and 
norms remain rare even in the more likely scenario. This finding matters to the broader argument 
because it suggests that wars caused by commitment problems do have more expansive war aims 
than other wars meaning the results in Model 1 are likely being driven by states pursing these 
larger war aims. 
 Last, Models 3 and 4 show that both early and late intervention are significantly 
correlated with ante-bellum power shifts, though the statistical significance is stronger for late 
intervention (H3a and H3b).24 Holding all other variables at their median, a one standard 
deviation increase in the power shift raises the odds of early intervention from 0.01% to 0.02%. 
For a contiguous great power in the same region, a similar shift increases the odds from 0.80% to 
1.36% in the post-1945 era and from 5.77% to 9.48% in the pre-1945 era, 70% and 64% 
increases respectively. 
Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in the power shifts raises the likelihood of 
late intervention from 0.06% to 0.10%. For a contiguous great power in the same region, a one 
standard deviation increase in the power shift raises the likelihood of late intervention from 4.39% 
to 6.95% in the post-1945 era and from 24.19% to 34.18% in the pre-1945 era, respective 
increases of 58% and 40%. Thus, the effect for early intervention is larger in percentage terms, 
but smaller in absolute terms. In other words, neither hypothesis is clearly correct as power shifts 
are strongly correlated with both early and late intervention. 
Several robustness checks were performed. First, two tests were performed to make sure 
that the results are not dependent on the large rate of intervention which occurred in the world 
wars. These are fairly strenuous tests as the world wars are exactly the sort of wars the theory 
                                                          
24 Neutrality pacts were omitted from Model 3 as there are no instances of them being positively correlated with the 
dependent variable. 
21 
 
would expect to prompt intervention—severe wars caused in part by significant commitment 
problems—and they are also wars which experienced a great deal of military intervention. One, a 
proxy variable was created for the world wars (World War One, World War Two in Europe, and 
World War Two in the Pacific) and included in the regression. This robustness check results in 
both intervention in general and early intervention in particular remaining significantly 
correlated with power shifts. Late intervention just misses the 0.05 cutoff. It is significantly 
correlated with power shifts at the 0.051 level. Involuntary intervention ceases to be significantly 
correlated with power shifts as all but one instance of involuntary intervention occurs in a world 
war. Two, the world wars were dropped from the regressions. When this is done, intervention in 
general, involuntary intervention, and late intervention are all significantly correlated with power 
shifts. Only early intervention ceases to be significantly correlated. Thus, while the world wars 
clearly play an important part in the relationship between intervention and power shifts, they do 
not drive the results by themselves. There remains a clear relationship between power shifts and 
intervention in the wars which are not global in nature. 
Second, whether or not the results depend on the specifications of the power shift 
variable was examined. To start, outlier values of the power shift variable were dropped and the 
analysis rerun. Most pre-war power shifts cluster towards the lower end of the variable’s scale, 
with 90% of the wars having a shift of less than 0.45. Three wars, the Franco-Turkish War 
(1919–1921), the Vietnamese-Cambodian War (1977–1979), and the Invasion of Afghanistan 
(2001), have shifts of over 0.7. If they are excluded from the analysis the results again hold. 
Outliers, therefore, are not driving the results. Checks were also performed on the sensitivity of 
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the results to the five year lag for the power shift variable. Lags of one year longer and shorter 
were used.25 The results are again essentially unchanged. 
Likewise, power shifts remain statistically significant for all intervention, involuntary 
intervention, and late intervention in stripped down models that contain no control variables. 
Early intervention is significant only at the 0.10 level in models with no control variables, but is 
significant at the 0.05 level in a basic model that includes defense pacts and the post-1945 era as 
controls. In the power shift only models, a one standard deviation increase in the power shift 
variable raises the odds of any form of military intervention for all states from 1.47% to 1.83%, 
of involuntary intervention from 0.23% to 0.43%, of early intervention from 0.35% to 0.48%, 
and of late intervention from 1.11% to 1.34%. 
Third, wars lasting less than 30 days were dropped from the regression. This helps to get 
at whether it is simply that commitment problems lengthen wars thereby allowing more time for 
intervention to occur, or if even among only long wars that wars caused by commitment 
problems are more likely to experience military intervention. The results for all four 
hypotheses—intervention, involuntary intervention, early intervention, and late intervention—
remain essentially unchanged with power shifts remaining a statistically significant prediction of 
intervention.26 
Fourth, 20 and 40 day cutoffs as opposed to 30 day cutoffs were used to distinguish 
between early and late intervention. These alternate cutoffs do not have a significant effect on the 
results. Fifth, the great power variable was replaced with CINC scores. This does not 
                                                          
25 With the shorter lag data become available for the Second Balkan, Off-Shore Islands, and Badme Border wars. 
26 This is consistent with Shirkey (2012b) who finds that intervention lengthens wars rather than that long wars are 
more likely to prompts intervention. Combined with the results herein, this suggests that it is commitment problems 
which both prompt intervention and which lengthen wars. 
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substantially affect the results for the power shift variables in any of the models.27 They are 
significantly correlated with involuntary intervention, early intervention, and military 
intervention in general. Last, non-resisting states were dropped from the list of involuntary 
interveners. Involuntary intervention remains significantly correlated with power shifts even with 
these non-resisting states excluded from the regression. Thus, the results are quite robust overall. 
 The results for several of the control variables are interesting as well. Consistent with 
prior research, great powers and geographically proximate states are significantly more likely to 
intervene than are other states. The one exception is for great powers and involuntary 
intervention. Great powers are not significantly more likely to be attacked than other states. This 
is intuitive given the ability of great powers to resist invasion and respond to attacks. Indeed, it is 
rather surprising that they are not less likely to be attacked. This may be an indication that the 
unattractiveness of attacking great powers is offset by their tendency to become diplomatically 
involved in the wars of others, thereby prompting attacks. Also, democracies appear to be more 
likely to intervene than other regime types (Models 1–3). Finally, intervention is less likely in the 
post-1945 period. This is driven less by an actual lower rate of intervention per war post-1945 
than by the fact there are far more states in the state system making the percentage of states that 
intervene much smaller.28 Though defense pacts are positively and significantly correlated with 
early intervention, they are not correlated with military intervention in general, late intervention, 
or involuntary intervention. This is broadly consistent with prior research which finds that the 
effect of defense pacts on intervention is concentrated in the early phases of wars (Joyce, Ghosn, 
and Bayer 2014; Melin and Koch 2010; Shirkey 2009; Stevenson 2011). There is likely a 
                                                          
27 Higher CINC scores, unlike great power status, are not significantly correlated with late intervention. See the 
discussion of the control variables below. 
28 Prior to 1946 there are 59 instances of military intervention. From 1946 onward there are 45. 
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selection effect at work where by the mid stages of wars reliable defense pacts have already been 
honored, leaving mainly those defense pacts which were less likely to ever be honored. 
Conclusion 
The results show that ante-bellum power shifts are associated with military intervention 
(H1) and with belligerent powers attacking or occupying neutral powers (H2). This supports the 
idea that certain causes of war should lead to larger conflagrations than others and the bargaining 
framework’s view that the same processes, in this case commitment problems, can be used to 
explain both war initiation and war expansion. This support for the bargaining framework’s 
ability to explain which wars are more likely to experience military intervention is important. 
The bargaining framework claims to be able to explain all stages of a war: initiation, war fighting 
and expansion, and termination. While many studies have supported the bargaining framework’s 
explanations for initiation and termination—and even for war fighting strategies—few studies 
have looked at the framework’s ability to explain expansion.29 If the bargaining framework’s 
mechanisms had been unable to aid in the understanding of military intervention and war 
expansion, it would have cast doubt on the framework’s ability to explain the totality of wars and 
to serve as a general model for understanding international conflict. Thus, the findings have 
implications beyond military intervention as they lend confidence to the bargaining framework’s 
explanations in general. 
When combined with the strong support for the relationship between commitment 
problems and late intervention (H3b) as well as between commitment problems and early 
intervention (H3a), the findings suggest the mechanisms of both the bargaining framework and 
its critics are at work. In other words, at times the factors which produce large, multilateral wars 
are distinct at the outset and at other times events must occur within wars to cause them to 
                                                          
29 See Shirkey (2009) for an exception. 
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expand. Also, it could be that while it is apparent to some states that they are affected by the 
initial bilateral dispute causing them to join quite quickly, the fact that the war will impact 
further states is not immediately obvious. Both world wars for instance had an initial wave of 
intervention followed by additional states intervening one by one as the wars continued. Thus, 
commitment problems set wars which experience military intervention, including general wars, 
apart from the larger body of conflicts through both faster and slower moving processes. 
It is equally important to understand what the findings do not imply. In no way do they 
suggest that wars caused by commitment problems will always attract outside military 
intervention. Nor do they suggest that commitment problems are the only pre-war factor 
indicative of wars which will experience military intervention. For instance, multiparty wars, of 
which wars experiencing military intervention are a subset, tend to be preceded by the formation 
of alliance ties (Valeriano and Vasquez 2010; Vasquez and Rundlett 2016). Determining whether 
such alliance formation is driven by commitment problems, causal of commitment problems, or 
has a distinctive logic of its own would prove a profitable avenue of future research. 
On the whole, the findings suggest that some wars may be more likely than others to 
draw outside states into the conflict. The findings also indicate which wars those are—wars 
fought over commitment problems as suggested by significant shifts in the relative balance of 
power ante-bellum. Whether policy makers can take advantage of this knowledge is less clear as 
the findings also suggest that not all wars caused by commitment problems will lead to military 
intervention. Further research into the causes of military intervention could potentially shed light 
on if certain types of power shifts are more likely to lead to military intervention than others and 
could potentially identify further causes of war which tend to lead to expansion. Doing so would 
be of use as such findings could possibly act as a guide to policy.  
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics—Continuous Variables 
 
 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min 
Value 
Max 
Value 
Skew Kurtosis 
Power Shift 0.1985 0.1373 0.1820 0.0081 0.7231 1.4623 4.6922 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics—Dichotomous Variables 
 Zero One 
All Intervention 6,279 96 
Involuntary Intervention 6,356 19 
Early Intervention 6,351 24 
Late Intervention 6,303 72 
Defense Pact 5,808 567 
Neutrality Pact 6,271 104 
Entente 6,090 285 
Same Region 5,483 892 
Contiguous 6,120 255 
Great Power 5,970 405 
Great Power in War 3,314 3,061 
Rival in War 6,206 169 
Democracy 4,721 1,654 
Joint Democracy 5,455 920 
Post-1945 2,098 4,277 
United Nations 6,137 238 
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Table 2: Power Shifts and Military Intervention 
 Model 1 (H1) 
All 
Intervention 
Model 2 (H2) 
Involuntary 
Intervention 
Model 3 (H3a) 
Early 
Intervention 
Model 4 (H3b) 
Late  
Intervention 
Power Shift ***2.872*** 
(0.599) 
***4.875*** 
(1.030) 
*2.951* 
(1.183) 
***2.674*** 
(0.671) 
Defense Pact 0.552 
(0.386) 
------- ***2.476*** 
(0.704) 
-0.586- 
(0.571) 
Neutrality Pact -0.857- 
(0.567) 
***2.512*** 
(0.693) 
------- -0.273- 
(0.583) 
Entente 0.904 
(0.479) 
------- 0.546 
(0.719) 
*1.232* 
(0.572) 
Same Region ***1.300*** 
(0.297) 
**1.942** 
(0.718) 
**1.291** 
(0.452) 
***1.341*** 
(0.364) 
Contiguous ***1.833*** 
(0.313) 
***1.931*** 
(0.572) 
*1.207* 
(0.569) 
***1.863*** 
(0.357) 
Great Power ***1.523*** 
(0.303) 
0.300 
(0.840) 
**1.843** 
(0.585) 
**1.113** 
(0.368) 
Great Power in War -0.029- 
(0.259) 
*2.301* 
(1.144) 
0.186 
(0.422) 
-0.264- 
(0.311) 
Democracy *0.791* 
(0.317) 
***2.259*** 
(0.563) 
*1.374* 
(0.548) 
0.672 
(0.381) 
Joint Democracy *0.821* 
 (0.388) 
-1.722 
(1.031) 
0.061 
(0.710) 
0.867 
(0.469) 
Rival in War 0.449 
(0.382) 
-0.672- 
(0.753) 
0.351 
(0.604) 
0.343 
(0.458) 
Post-1945 
 
***-1.891*** 
(0.377) 
------- **-2.010** 
(0.734) 
***-1.939*** 
(0.455) 
United Nations ***4.301*** 
(0.427) 
------- 0.971 
(1.199) 
***4.883*** 
(0.513) 
Constant ***-5.951***- 
(0.327) 
***-11.039***- 
-(1.245) 
***-7.721***- 
(0.624) 
***-5.990***- 
(0.363) 
N 6375 6375 6375 6375 
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
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Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Intervention for Proximate Great Powers for 
Various Sizes of Power Shifts 
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